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The Philippine Debt So Far: From Aquino III (2011–2016) to Duterte (2017)

22 min readAug 2, 2017

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Sisyphus Retires

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Analogies evolve over time. We used to compare the Philippines, for instance, to an “oriental pearl”, coveted by colonists due to its rich resource, lush nature, and industrious people. Martial Law was imposed and the Philippines became a “caged dove”, surrounded by barbed wires and the Philippine constabulary. Cory Aquino’s weak government, coupled with coup attempts, continuing insurgency, natural disasters, earned us a title of “sick man of Asia” by early 1990s. Then Fidel Ramos stepped in and re-branded the country as a “rising tiger”, zooming forward to year 2000.

The same thing is true with the Philippine debt. Before, the prevailing analogy would be something like the myth of Sisyphus — the hero condemned by Zeus to roll a rock to the top of the mountain only to have the rock fall down again at the bottom, ad infinitum. Our post-EDSA I economy has been condemned to two decades of indebtedness by strongman Ferdinand Marcos (who certainly acted like a Greek god during his reign). Then we were compelled to continuously borrow new debts in order to pay for maturing ones, lest we risk default. This is on top of borrowing to pay for the gap of our weak revenue efforts, in order to provide for social services and critical infrastructure (read: ZTE-NBN).

In our Sisyphus world, the rock gets bigger through time (no thanks to interest rates), but Sisyphus’ muscles also get stronger. This was the analogy of the Department of Finance (DoF) close to the end of administration of Benigno Aquino III — the son of the President who honored Marcos’ odious debts. Their story is this: as outstanding debt grew from P395.5 billion in 1986 to P5.95 trillion in end-2015, debt-to-GDP declined from 58.63% to 44.8%. Revenues per capita, adjusting for inflation, increased by 130.96% compared to 1986. Debt service burden, borrowings to revenues, and other indicators of “debt unsustainability” summarily declined via efforts of Ramos and Arroyo to securitize our debts and shift to domestic sources of credit.

Figure 1. Debt to Size of Economy (Source: National Accounts of the Philippines, Bureau of Treasury)
Figure 2. Revenue per Capita (2000 prices) (Source: PSA for population projections, BTr for Revenues)

The cost, of course, is staggering, as the Philippine government was compelled to abandon its citizens to chronic poverty and unprecedented misery, with the number of poor Filipinos, 24.45 million in 2013, barely moving from 23.97 million in 1986. Under-spending in infrastructure stopped our development clock at a time when our neighbours are zooming past the developing world status. Our unstable power situation due to lack of investments in power plants shooed away Japanese investors. Austerity in education pulled our students behind in ASEAN and world rankings. Our economy was eaten alive by our competitors, not unlike Sisyphus’ son Glaucus who met the same fate in the mouth of his horses.

But we all know that Greek tragedy.

Now, Sisyphus has seemingly mustered enough strength to push the rock uphill and suspend it there. It was as if Zeus’ punishment has ended. Our debt service (principal plus interest) to total expenditure (expenditures plus principal amortization) declined from 45.69% in 1987 to 20.16% in 2016 (18.07% projected for 2017). If we only take interest rate as percentage of expenditure, the decline was from 30.78% to 11.94% (10% projected for 2017) over the same period. Our average consolidated public sector deficit was reversed from 5.87% of our GDP in 1986 to a surplus of 0.59% of our GDP in 2016. In fact, we are actually failing to spend the money we already have, primarily due to lack of absorptive capacity of agencies.

Figure 3. Debt Service to Expenditure (Source: BTr)

DoF declared: the debt cycle has ended. No more pushing up a rock just to see it fall down again. Sisyphus can now retire. We need a new analogy.

Damocles’ Perpetual Insecurity

Enter Damocles, the obsequious courtesan of Sicilian tyrant Dionysius II of Syracuse. Smarmy Damocles was pandering to Dionysius, as usual, and expressing his admiration of the tyrant’s fortune. Dionysius then offered Damocles to switch places so Damocles can enjoy the fortune he so covets, on the condition that there will be a sword hanging above the throne, held only by a single hair of horse’s tail. Damocles quickly agreed, but after some time, he had enough of the uncertainty of whether he will survive each next minute. He lets go of the throne.

DoF boasts of breaking 18-year record in debt management performance. Our pandering to International Financial Institutions (IFI) like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), following their harshest prescriptions of austerity, privatization, and deregulation, brought us the glory associated with improving credit ratings, and there is no turning back. We earned the gold prize in fiscal management. We have the throne. We are king.

But here comes Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC), the party pooper, with sound and fury, countering DoF’s claim and exposing that as of 2015, we are already P6.4 trillion in debt. FDC revealed at that time that Filipino owed a whopping P62,235.26 to thousands of bond holders and a handful of bankers who saw it fit to move their money away from Greek and US bonds — which up until the 90s are favorite investment vehicles of global financial sector.

Figure 4. Debt per Capita (Source: PSA for Population Projections, BTr for Outstanding Debt data)

Nothing to worry about, the DoF retorted. Our economy can handle it. Never mind that our current debt-to-GDP only surpassed 1996 levels, which gives us something to ponder: just two years after 1996, our financial and export sector would have crashed due to the Asian Financial Crisis. Another four years, we will have experienced under Arroyo the worst fiscal crisis in post-EDSA history — forcing the government to impose the draconian R-VAT.

Notwithstanding our current fiscal strength, it is always possible to have another Ramos to expose us to global financial shocks and another Arroyo to plunge us to depths of another, probably worse, fiscal crisis.

For Damocles, the bigger the sword, the higher probability of his death. DoF might have told him: Don’t worry! We’ll just put more horse hair to hold it!

Let us take a brief look at how DoF supposedly solved our debt problem. As of 2016, 64.6% of our debts are domestic. Of the domestic debts, 99.98% are government securities (GS). That figure is 62.23% for foreign debts. From 2000 to 2016, the share of GS in the total outstanding debt jumped from 67.9% to 86.62% — from a peak of 88.08% in 2014. Comparing this with the 22.48% in 1986, we surely have moved away from Official Development Assistance (ODA) and other direct-to-project loans which was the feature of the Marcos dictatorship. In 2014 alone, our net fixed rate Treasury bond borrowings reached P286.52 billion, 3.86 times larger than the combined program and project loans from abroad.

Figure 5. Debt Securitization (Source: Computed from BTr data)

What is fueling this addiction to paper debts? The answer is simple — the willingness of the debt market to buy GS at the price set by DoF — the interest rates. The DoF, as with the rest of the country’s economic technocracy, worked so hard on our country’s “macroeconomic fundamentals” during Arroyo and Aquino III years. They reined in social expenditures while imposing higher valued added taxes. They eventually succeeded to establish a low interest-rate, low-inflation regime — never mind all the social cost of austerity and regressive taxes.

Treasury data reveals that the government was able to reduce interest rate for 91-day, 182-day, and 364-day T-bills from 9.86%, 10.84% and 11.8% in 2000 to 1.5%, 1.58%, and 1.76% in 2016[1]. Similarly, interest for 5-year, 7-year, and 25-year bonds dropped from 13.76%, 14.35% and 14.8% to 3.38%, 3.56%, and 3.56%[2]. The very low interest rates are further pulled down by the withholding tax on interest pegged at 20%.

Figure 6. Interest Rate of Government Securities (%)
Figure 7. Cost of Debt

DoF is at the height of its confidence — the market will buy what we will sell them[3]. In fact, from 2010 to 2015, we received a number of credit upgrades, including but not limited to — Moody’s: Ba3 to Baa2, S&P: BB to BBB, Fitch: BB+ to BBB-, JCRA: BBB to BBB+. By 2013, the three credit rating agencies have judged our GS as investment grade.

Horse’s Hair: Interest Rates and Credit Ratings

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Figure 8. Credit Rating History — Aquino III years (Source: SONA 2015 Technical Notes)

Interest rates and credit ratings have a common amazing property: they are both subject to positive feedback. When you decrease interest rates, the economy usually becomes a little more bullish. Capitalists increase a bit their uptake of credit to expand their businesses. When that happens, banks would want to loan more, driving the price of loans — interest rates — further down.

Theoretically, the increased economic activity will kick in the negative feedback mechanism: an increase in inflation rate which will dampen consumption and reduce economic activity. In the Philippines, however, inflation rate, at least up to the Aquino III administration, has been steadily decreasing — dropping from a high of 10.7 in January 1999 to a low of 1.6 by May 2016, even as our growth averaged 6% in the last administration. There was little domestic force to stop local interest rates from declining during Aquino III’s regime.

The same is true for credit ratings. When a country receives a rating upgrade, the money it spends on interest payments decrease, increasing money available for principal amortization or for avoiding new debts. The improving fiscal health is taken as another signal for another round of credit rating upgrade. In fact, the severe decline in share of interest payment in spending was probably the reason for Aquino III’s massive underspending[4], especially since its tax performance is not exactly stellar[5]. The underspending, however, ensured low deficits, indicated fiscal health, and sent good signals to credit rating agencies and possible bond investors.

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Figure 9. Budget Differentials. Source: DBM

Unfortunately, it is this feedback mechanism that can lead to our own undoing. A single credit downgrade can lead us to a dangerous downward spiral — one that can force the Treasury to hike interest rates to attract more income, which would then increase interest payments and compromise our fiscal health. It becomes more dangerous for us: we are heavily dependent on market-sensitive debt instruments — and its nominal amount is huge. The sword hanging over our heads is getting heavier and heavier. It needs more and more horse hair to suspend it.

Our huge nominal debts, even as our GDP surpasses it, give us a sense of economic insecurity the same way that the sword above the throne shakes the very core of Damocles — even as he relishes the power and wealth of the tyranny. Any given time, central banks of the world can reverse their quantitative easing strategies, siphoning off Philippine’s market for government-issued foreign denominated debt instruments — hiking the rates of foreign loans we use to pay for outstanding ones. Any given time, a temporary stock market boom can drain investments away from government-issued domestic bonds, forcing the government to increase domestic interest rates or impose demand-dampening tax hikes.

So the hair that holds Damocles’ sword is the continuous stability if not decline in the interest rates, and continuing credit rating upgrade. A single reversal will snap one hair, the pressure distributed to the rest and increasing the likelihood that any of them snaps too. They snap one by one, at a faster and faster rate, until the sword is lodged firmly into Damocles’ fragile skull.

Bad Omen

And that is what seems to be happening now as we enter the administration of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte. Looking at Treasury data, it seems that GS interest rates are slowly creeping up. From May 2016 to June 2017, we saw the following hikes in the T-Bill yields: 91-day (1.674%-2.094%), 182-day (1.650%-2.439%), 364-day (1.866%-2.863%). From June 2016 to May 2017, T-Bond 3-year yield increased from 3.38% to 4.25%. For 7-year T-Bonds, yield hiked from 3.5% in May 2016 to 4.5% in June 2017. This will later have an impact on projected interest payments, which will sure put more pressure to generate revenues.

The decline in inflation rate seems to have stopped too. From 1.6 at the start of the Duterte administration last May 2016, we saw the figure creep to 3.4 last April 2017, before stabilizing at 2.8 in June. This means added pressure to the Treasury to increase nominal interest rates so it can continue to float its securities; after all, it is the real interest rates that is of any real interest to bondholders. It will also put pressure on the deficit, especially since services that the government procures from the market will now cost higher.

Meanwhile, growth itself was slower than expected for an election year[6]. If the revenue effort does not grow faster, then it signals to the market that it can only rely on debt financing — which can possibly hike interest rates now and therefore interest payments in the future. The negative feedback mechanism which can stop the glorious descent of interest rates amid economic growth is now slowly being activated.

It doesn’t help that there are threats of credit rating downgrades given Duterte’s unconventional governance methods, including the deadly drug war. S&P, while affirming Philippines’ BBB/A-2 rating, warned that a downgrade is possible, infuriating Duterte. His political actuations against foreign entities, including his recent announcement that we will be refusing all aid from the European Union (EU), may also reduce the amount of low interest ODA the Philippines is receiving from European nations, increasing the tempo of transition to GS and putting an upward pressure to local interest rates.

There are a number of reasons why our macroeconomic fundamentals are being rattled. For exogenous causes, we can point to the recent hikes in US Federal Reserve interest rates. It can push the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) to adopt defensive measures, specifically by raising rates too. This will put pressure to the Bureau of Treasury (BTr) to do the same. Capital outflow can also happen, given that US seems to be more attractive now. In this case, peso may depreciate. This may be a bad news for us given the increase predominance of US dollar currency denominated debts, from 77.1% of total foreign debts in 2016 compared to 51.5% in 1996[7].

Figure 10. Foreign Debt by Currency Type (Source: BTr)

Policy Reversal

The endogenous reasons might tell us more. For one, Budget Secretary Benjamin Diokno, Jr. (also the budget Secretary of ousted President Joseph Estrada) as early as June 2016 already announced his intention to widen the deficit to 3–5% of the GDP, probably in response to the underspending problem of the Aquino III administration and the consequent lag in infrastructure development. Diokno fulfilled his promise, and widened the deficit from 0.91% of Aquino III’s last full budget to 5.38% in the proposed 2017 budget. (Note that the average deficit under Aquino III is just 1.62% of GDP.)

Figure 11. NG / Public Sector Consolidated Fiscal Position (Source: DoF, BTr)

The impact on outstanding debt will soon be felt. During the Aquino III administration, outstanding debt grew at an average annual pace of 4.38%. Under Duterte’s projected 2017 budget points to an expected increase of 7.16%. Compare that to Aquino III’s first year rate of 4.94% and final year rate of 2.28%. We may be seeing a steep increase in outstanding debt, especially with widened deficits.[8]

Figure 12. Growth of Outstanding Debt

Diokno then announced the “Build, Build, Build” initiative — a pump-priming infrastructure program that will cost P8.2 trillion (or US$167 billion), which includes at least 30 big-ticket projects in the next five years. This is supposed to usher the “golden age of infrastructure” in the country. As if on cue, the NEDA Board’s first meeting under the Duterte administration saw the quick approval of P171.14 billion worth of projects. The April of next year, NEDA Secretary Ernesto Pernia announced a three-year rolling infrastructure program (TRIP) amounting to P3.6 trillion from 2018 to 2020 — P1.13 trillion in 2018, P1.18 trillion in 2019 and P1.29 trillion in 2020. A few months later, President Duterte approved another P305.64 billion for 11 projects.

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How will the money for “Build, Build, Build” be generated? Diokno, for one, is already keen on avoiding Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) — another hallmark of Aquino III’s investment strategy. Instead, they are pursuing the “hybrid PPP” schemes, wherein government agencies will undertake construction, and operations and management of the finished facilities will be bid out to private companies. The financing will then come from ODA or through government’s own funds. The reasoning is clear — PPP schemes are simply too slow, as shown by the experience of the Aquino III administration. This means less role for private sector and more government share in infrastructure financing.

This is the context in which Pernia tried to scare congress into expediting its flagship tax reform program — the Tax Reform for Acceleration and Inclusion Act (TRAIN). Pernia warned that instead of a Golden Age of Infrastructure, there will be a Dark Age of infrastructure if Congress won’t approve TRAIN. In fact, any modification in TRAIN will supposedly transform “Build, Build, Build” to “small Build, small Build, small Build”. But with the administration already committed to the infrastructure program — hinging its promise to generate 12 million jobs on it — it is plausible that without TRAIN, we will end up with increased reliance on ODA[9].

Beijing-Arroyo Redux

Where will the ODA come from? For starters, we already have China pledging as large as $9 billion –$6 billion in ODA and $3 billion in loans, on top of other investments[10]. It was later revealed that China’s loan and investment package to the Philippines is part of its Belt and Road initiative, an ambitious $900-billion global project to “through which China wants to boost trade and stimulate economic growth across Asia and beyond… by building massive amounts of infrastructure connecting it to countries around the globe” — creating a “modern Silk Road” which will jumpstart “a new era of globalisation”. This, even as it faces an imminent debt and banking crisis itself.

This increased reliance on Chinese ODA is another policy reversal from Aquino III in the Duterte administration, but is actually a throwback to the policies of then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, who was embroiled with a series of controversies regarding several tied[11] projects financed by ODA from the Chinese Export and Import Bank (CEXIM). One can remember how the $329-million National Broadband Network (NBN) project, the $503-million North Luzon Railways Project Phase 1 and Phase 2 (Northrail), the $884-million South Luzon Railways Project Mainline (Southrail), and the $465-million Cyber Education Project (CEP) rocked the Arroyo administration post Hello Garci. The political pressure was so great that Arroyo was forced to convene an investigative panel to examine anomalies in the said projects, though of course it is composed of her allies.

There were also suspicions that the ODA-financed projects Arroyo secured from China are supposedly to sway the government towards a compromising stance with regards the contested islands in the West Philippine Sea[12] — a stance which was largely reversed by the Aquino III administration, which pursued international arbitration on the matter[13]. Like Arroyo, Duterte’s softening stance on the Spratly’s is seen as a consequence of Duterte’s need for Chinese financing for his infrastructure projects.

But as soon as announcements of the loans were made, experts and economists were already sounding alarms. The warning that has the most impact, deservedly or otherwise, is the article which appeared at Forbes magazine written by a certain Anders Corr, a self-styled political risk analyst. Corr warned that the “Build, Build, Build” program “could increase current Philippine national government debt of approximately $123 billion, to $290 billion” and “at 10% interest the new debt could go to $452 billion, bringing Philippines’ debt-to-GDP ratio to 197%, second-to-worst in the world.” Corr added that “even at 5%, which is nearest the lending rate of interest published by the IMF and World Bank for the Philippines, the effect of such a large sum would be an increase in debt (in addition to existing debt) of $275 billion after 10 years. That would bring the Philippines’ debt-to-GDP ratio to approximately 136%”. Corr concluded that: “Dutertenomics, fueled by expensive loans from China, will put the Philippines into virtual debt bondage if allowed to proceed.”

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Figure 13. Projection by Anders Corr

Diokno quickly reacted — any borrowing scheme of the government will pursue an 80–20 scheme, favoring domestic sources over foreign ones. We won’t be borrowing the entire amount for “Build-Build-Build”. Diokno said that “concerns that the Duterte administration’s fiscal strategy may lead to indebtedness are therefore unsubstantiated, considering the current and expected levels of debt-to-GDP ratio[14], the hefty gross international reserves[15], and the low interest rate regime.” Pernia, on the other hand, clarified that Chinese ODA is only at the order of 2–3% interest rate[16].

True, Corr’s analysis may be exaggerated, but even if we assume that only 20% of the P8.2 trillion “Build, Build, Build” program — or P1.64 trillion pesos (around P1.7–1.8 trillion by 2022 if we add interest) — will be financed by loans, that is still a worrisome figure. The gambit of Dutertenomics is that huge debt-financed projects will translate to huge multiplier effects in the economy, which will ramp up revenues.

But this begs the question: who benefits from all of these? Remember that ODA with China (and Japan) will likely be tied, which means there is a huge ODA “flow-back” — much of the money they loaned to us ended up financing the operations of their companies[17]. Finally, there is a huge danger if we ever come close to a default of our debts to China, then China might offer a debt-to-equity swap — in exchange for forgiving debts, Chinese companies will end up owning shares of the infrastructure they built. If this happens, then Corr’s prediction of “virtual debt bondage” will actually be a real one.

Fiscal Bomb

So to sum up so far — we are facing a huge deficit due to “Build, Build, Build”; Duterte’s tax reform agenda is not yet approved; treasury interest rates are increasing as foreign interest rates follow the Federal Reserve; inflation is up; Chinese high-interest ODA threatens to flood in again, not to mention that we are asking Japan to do the same too. All of these create the perfect recipe for a fiscal bomb. The financial markets might be playing the waiting game for now — but one wrong move can trigger another round of fiscal crisis, opening up opportunities for financial vultures and imperial hegemons.

For it is all too familiar —prior to the 2003–2004 fiscal crisis, local interest rates have gone up after two years of sliding down since the Estrada ouster[18], when US currency and interest rates began its slow (albeit temporary) recovery from 9/11 shock. Then in 2002, we have reached the worst deficit since Marcos — 5.02% of the GDP. Then the fiscal crisis happened, the subsequent political shock surreptitiously exploited by Arroyo to dragoon Congress into passing the unpopular and regressive R-VAT. Two-three years later, Chinese ODA will be flooding our coffers — and shoring up the politically unstable Arroyo regime.

Our primary strategy — moving towards domestic debts, also poses some dangers. For one, our government securities is a go-to stable investment for corporations, particularly insurance companies. From 2.11% of outstanding debt in 1996, the share of our debts owed to private insurance companies more than doubled to 4.91% in 2013. This means that any danger of domestic debt default will likely affect the performance of insurance companies — and therefore the premiums they’ll be charging for future clients. The price of insurance will skyrocket should there be any threat of inability to pay on the part of the government. And this is just what we have monitored so far — corporations, holdings companies, asset managers likely bought government securities — and they are all vulnerable.

Figure 14. Composition of Debt (Source: BTr, DoF, author’s computations)

In its decision to stop Bt Talong, the Philippine Supreme Court used a concept called the “Precautionary Principle”, a principle designed to prevent decision makers from putting their own constituencies to a risk of a certain highly undesirable event happening. If only we can apply the principle to our public finance, which is certainly vulnerable to exogenous shocks now that we intricately tied to the whims and winds of the global financial market.

We should stand for a public finance policy that minimizes the exposure of the state from these volatilities. For this, we definitely need a debt audit — one that goes beyond specific debt items, but also investigates the possible implications of our monetary, fiscal, and economic policy to our fiscal health, especially since we have embarked on a new policy regime on deficits and financing.

Notes

[1] In 1986, the rates are 14.33%, 15.44%, and 13.15% respectively.

[2] At this point, one might be puzzled: why do GS remain popular to investors despite yielding very low rates? One possible explanation is that the Philippine business environment is not robust enough to be attractive to investments, which is why bond markets, instead of equities, seem to remain a good choice. However, investments also performed quite well during the period. From a 3,000 level in July 2010, the Philippine Stock Exchange Composite Index (PSEi) closed at an all-time high of 8,127.48 points on 10 April 2015. So we have to look for other explanations.

Figure 15: Philippine Stock Market Composite Index (Source: BSP)

[3] According to an investment primer prepared by the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (citing the Bureau of Treasury), GS buyers “include mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, commercial banks, corporations, state and local governments, central bank, and international investors. Individual clients buy or hold government bonds through common trust funds/unit investment trust funds, mutual funds, or pension plans. Those who opt to purchase government securities through these channels tend to look for dependable income, relative safety, and diversification.”

[4] Data from the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) point to P103.70 billion of its budget unspent for 2013. By 2014, we saw this figure triple to a whopping P302.68 billion.

[5] Compare Ramos and Aquino III’s performance using this data: http://www.dof.gov.ph/index.php/data/taxeffort/

[6] “The 6.4-percent gross domestic product (GDP) growth was shy of the lower end of the government’s projected or target range of 6.5–7.5 percent for the year. It was also significantly below the 6.8-percent growth rate in the same quarter last year.” — former NEDA Secretary Cielito Habito: http://opinion.inquirer.net/104226/why-the-slowdown-2#ixzz4jPJKnRqG

[7] One can add the bad news that the Japanese Yen is also getting stronger (http://www.businessinsider.com/japanese-yen-may-17-2017-2017-5) — an unfortunate development considering that 13.98% of total foreign debts in 2016 are in that denomination.

[8] We can check out at least two possibilities, either Duterte mimics Aquino III’s fiscal behavior and maintains an average of 4.38% annual growth in outstanding debts, or he sustains his projected outstanding debt growth of 7.16% from 2016 to 2017 all throughout its term. The difference of those rates is P1.13 trillion, if we start from 2017’s P6.53 trillion debt. If we assume that Duterte will sustain an outstanding debt growth of 7.16% throughout his term, then we have been able to explain almost 70% of the P1.64 trillion “Build, Build, Build” loans. Assuming that the annual cost of debt — defined as interest payments to outstanding debts — is 5%, then this translates to a differential of P158 billion additional interest payments

[9] As to why the government would probably rely on ODA on the absence of a BOT/PPP option is explained well by UPSE Prof. Raul Fabella and Prof. Emmanuel De Dios: “Congress seems incapable of approving infrastructure budgets of any sizeable amount and with any gestation periods longer than the period between two elections. The most that lawmakers seem capable of mustering are local projects of limited significance (local roads, local school buildings, etc.), designed primarily for maximum electoral impact on the ‘folks back home’. We like to call this the ‘divide-by-N imperative’. As a result, most projects of a sizeable character or of national significance have always relied on either of two modes: (a) foreign financing such as for the North Rail Project and MRT Line 2 (Santolan-Dasmariñas); (b) various build-operate-and-transfer schemes, such as the NAIA Terminal 3 and the North Luzon Expressway improvement… In both cases, since no budgetary allocation is required, the executive branch is able to give fuller scope to its vision, thus evading the parochialism of congressional priorities — but also eluding congressional scrutiny, except for the odd ex post congressional investigation or so.” (from Lacking a backbone: The controversy over the “National Broadband Network” and Cyber-education projects)

[10] A series of investigative articles from the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) on Duterte’s China deals appeared on the Philippine Star online: 1) http://www.philstar.com/news-feature/2017/05/09/1698261/analysis-dutertes-china-deals-dissected, 2) http://www.sunstar.com.ph/cebu/business/2017/05/18/china-loans-philippines-raise-fears-542484, 3) http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/05/22/1702364/palace-urged-bare-details-chinese-aid-loans

[11] Chinese National Machinery and Equipment Corporation Group (CNMEG) was supposed to be the contractor for Northrail, China National Technical Import and Export Corporation (CNTEC) for Southrail, Tsinghua Tongfang Nuctech Co. (NUCTECH) for CEP, and Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) Limited for NBN.

[12] See this: http://verafiles.org/articles/recalling-jmsu, and this: http://pcij.org/blog/2008/03/17/the-spratlys-deal-selling-philippine-sovereignty

[13] See this: http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/99115-aquino-legacy-defying-china, this: http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/99116-part-2-china-problem-no-long-term-plan, and this: http://www.rappler.com/nation/9128-how-china-views-aquino,-arroyo

[14] DBM: “In fact, the debt-to GDP ratio is projected to decline from 40.6 percent in 2016 to 38.1 percent in 2022. As compared to its Asean neighbors, the Philippines continues to post a steady debt-to-GDP ratio. Singapore, for instance, posted a high debt-to-GDP ratio of 98.2 percent as of 2016,” according to the DBM… Furthermore, the Philippines’ external debt has also been decreasing from $77.474 billion in 2015 to $73.805 billion as of March 2017. This highlights that the country is doing well in paying off its debts.”

[15] Diokno added that the country’s gross international reserves (GIR) — standing at $81.4 billion — can cover 11.7 months’ worth of imports, way over the minimum three-month buffer.

[16] Note: For Japan, Pernia said it is less than 1% interest rate. Source.

[17] For PHL-PRC ODA deals that require Chinese labor, it has the effect of mopping up excess domestic labor. For deals that require Chinese capital, it is their perfect solution for ensuring the viability of their financially vulnerable corporations.

[18] From 2001–2002, rates for T-Bills 91-day, 182-day, 364-day and T-Bonds 2-year dropped from 9.87, 11.18, 11.98, and 13.40 to 5.43, 6.50, 6.84, and 9.03 respectively. By 2004, rates already increased to 7.34, 8.32, 9.22, and 10.38 respectively.

Other Charts

Figure 16. Debt to Revenue
Figure 16. Revenue Effort
Figure 17: Annual Production/Income per Capita (2000 prices)
Figure 18. How much of our taxes go to debt?
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Figure 19. Expenditure per Capita sans Interest Payments
Figure 20. Gross Borrowings to GDP
Figure 21. Debt Service to Exports

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