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Founder, funder, owner, seller. 

Who owns? Who controls? Google, Facebook & Dual Class Shares

6 min readApr 3, 2014

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Two pieces of news got me thinking recently. First, attached to the widely quoted story that Mark Zuckerberg paid himself only $1 last year, was the fact that he has 60% of voting power in Facebook (Bloomberg). Second, news that Sheryl Sandberg sold half of her Facebook stock last year, alongside the fact that she is the second largest owner of the company with a stake of 0.5% worth approx $1bn (Seeking Alpha Blog).

A few questions: why the disparity between Zuckerberg’s 60% control, versus Sandberg’s 0.5% ownership? Is it just because he built the thing where as she (merely) made it profitable? Or is control different from ownership at Facebook? Is this to do with those Share Classes that you often hear about but never really needed to understand before?

Cashing out, but keeping your chips to play with

When Facebook IPO’d in May 2012, the shares in the company sold were separated into two types: Class A and B — a dual class structure. A Class A share holds just 1 vote whilst a Class B share has 10 votes. This disparity of voting rights meant that holders of Class B stock (the Facebook insiders) controlled 96.3% of the voting power, with 57.3% of that being concentrated in Founder, Chairman and CEO Mr. Mark Zuckerberg (SEC Filing). Facebook’s SEC Filings is explicit on this:

The dual class structure of our common stock and the voting agreements among certain stockholders have the effect of concentrating voting control with our CEO, and also with employees and directors and their affiliates; this will limit or preclude your ability to influence corporate matters.

Interestingly, this is more control than he had in pre-IPO Facebook days, where he controlled only 28.4% of the company. The day after the IPO, he controlled c.57% of the company, and has since increased this to c.60%, selling down Class A shares for money to buy Class B shares for power.

This disconnect between ownership and voting rights is certainly not unique to Facebook. Dual classes of shares are long established. Typically, they are found in companies where financial return may not be the absolute priority. This may be a mission-based company, such as the New York Times, or Washington Post, where they want to insulate the company’s product (i.e. distribution of news) from the market. Family companies often use them, notably the Ford family, who own c. 2% of the car company, but control 40% of voting rights. (Forbes)

Google, LinkedIn, Groupon and Zynga all made use of the dual classes of shares in order to let the founders retain control. Mark Pincus of Zynga (former CEO) allocated himself an entire class: Class C, shares of which have 70 votes each. Groupon, everyone’s favorite provider of junk-email, allocated each Class B share 150 votes. Interestingly Twitter did not choose a dual class structure, perhaps since most of the founders were already sidelined from the business by the point of the IPO.

Google: More Chips Please

Google are shortly to launch a Class C share with zero voting rights, which will be publicly traded simultaneously as the Class A shares (previously: GOOG, renamed now GOOGL). If you held 1 Class A share (1 vote) or 1 Class B share (10 votes) you will receive and additional 1 Class C share (zero votes). As well as having the unfortunate effect of forcing the S&P 500 to include 501 shares (genuinely), it dramatically increases the potential disparity between ownership and control. It dilutes only the Class A shares’ voting rights and leaving the insider-only Class B shares undiluted. Yesterday, Google’s Class B shares equated to 17% of the company’s equity (i.e. ownership), but controlled 67% of the voting power. Today, to control the same 67% of voting power Page/Brin/Schmidt need own only 8% of the company.

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As founders, I can imagine Zuckerberg, Page, Brin etc being wary of losing control of their baby to Wall Street investors, particularly given the difference of cultures between Silicon Valley and Wall Street. But an IPO is just another sales process. The investors now ‘own’ the company but they have no say over what they own. As James Surowiecki put in, in an excellent piece in the New Yorker just prior to Facebook’s IPO in 2012:

Whereas the C.E.O.s of most public companies have to spend time kowtowing to investors, Zuckerberg and his peers are insisting on the right to say, “Thanks for your money. Now shut up.”

Short-term bad.

But wait — aren’t those dispossessed, disenfranchised investors, the same investors accused of instilling short-termism into our great companies? The Harvard Business Review focused on this question earlier this year, pulling luminaries from McKinsey & Co, and the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board together to poll over a thousand board members and C-level execs from across the world. They found concern that short-term goals reduced long term enterprise value and blamed pressure exerted on corporate boards by institutional shareholders. Yes: those same dispossessed, disenfranchised investors.

Surely it’s a good thing to liberate business leaders from short-term whims of the hedge funds and investment managers interested in chasing only market-beating returns (and resultant incentive fees).

Builders. Visionaries. Frauds.

My question is how much to insulate the companies from the markets. A core principle of capitalism is the alignment of control of capital allocation with ownership of that capital. Is it healthy that Zuckerberg controls 60% of a $157bn enterprise without the alignment of interest that comes from ownership?

One high-profile example of the downside of dual class share structures is Conrad Black, former CEO of Hollinger International, (owner of UK Telegraph, and the Chicago Sun Times). He owned all of the company’s Class B shares, which meant a 30% equity stake, but 73% of the voting power. He was imprisoned for multiple abuses of his position, including throwing his wife a $40,000 birthday party (Washington Post) and a half-million dollar trip to Bora Bora.

Even disregarding such fraudulent outliers, isn’t this de-alignment of interests, just a bad principle for corporate governance? There are several academic studies on this subject that would suggest this is true. Harvard Business School & Wharton found that over a 17 year period to 2001, dual class shares under performed the market. Digging a bit deeper into the study however, it found that dual class companies tended to invest less in R&D and Capital expenditure. These are certainly not accusations that could be leveled at Google or Facebook currently.

More interesting, is a study written for the European Centre for Corporate Governance in 2008. It found that as divergence between ownership and voting rights widened, the following happened:

CEOs receive greater compensation, and managers engage in more inefficient empire building activities in terms of acquisitions and large capital expenditures

Facebook’s shares have increased roughly 250% over the past year. Zuckerberg is dropping his salary to $1. Google’s stock is up 130% and even pooling their salaries, founders Brin and Page would not be able to split a 2 buck chuck anymore. Clearly, there is no asset stripping or fraud; these founders appear intensely motivated to keep building and building and building.

Conclusions: Empire or Enterprise — which is better?

So if fraud is not likely, and the CEOs are not pocketing outsized salaries, what about the risk of empire building? Faced with recent aggressive, sometimes cross-category acquisitions such as Oculus ($2bn), Nest ($3bn), Boston Dynamic (price unknown), WhatsApp ($19bn) there is clearly empire building going on, but the long term Return on Investment (ROI) is as yet unknown and will be highly debated.

2014 seems likely to bring more founder-centric tech IPOs: Box, DropBox , AirBnB, Alibaba, Spotify and others. Surely the dangers of dual class companies need to be examined again and more widely understood. Until there is a high-profile example of founder-failure (say, WhatApp’s user base moving to Line or Kik, Oculus’s key employees leaving or similar), it seems that investors will let founders cash in their stakes but keep on playing the game.

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Oliver Cowan
Oliver Cowan

Written by Oliver Cowan

Recently moved to San Francisco from London. Looking for interesting things to do.