Entrepreneur or innovator?
A lesson I learned from Andy Johnson-Laird
Back in the days that software arrived through the post, and probably hadn’t been tested on the computer you were using, part of my job was getting other people’s software un-broken.
I started with the obvious strategy: if our customer had a problem, and I could reproduce it, I’d call the author’s technical support line and raise the issue, so it could get fixed.
Nobody ever told me off for doing it this way, even though it cost time to get the issue raised (I was in the UK, and most of the authors were in the USA), and there was no guarantee it would progress further (if the brand of computer wasn’t widespread in the USA, well, when was that issue going to get serious attention?).
Being curious, though, I’d generally load the software in a debugger, and if it crashed, disassemble the code (i.e. turn all those noughts and ones in the computer’s memory back into the instructions that a programmer had typed) and try and see what went wrong. If it was another kind of issue, I’d step through the code from the start, looking for tell-tale signs of common issues.
Sometimes this was the work of a few minutes, often it was hours, and occasionally it would take up all my spare time for a week or two.
Often there was one obvious issue — obvious why it caused the problem, obvious why it wasn’t causing a problem in the USA, obvious how to sort it out in a way that would achieve the programmer’s intent by a different method.
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So that gave me a new strategy.
Having found the problem, I’d work out how to fix it. Then, if the fix meant adding code, I’d hunt around for an area of cruft (code or data in the program that never got used) I could safely overwrite with my fix, and make up a new software manufacturing master so that our customers wouldn’t hit the problem. And if I could find a way, I’d send the fix to the author (this was before the web, and in the days that “email” meant lots of different systems, most of which talked to each other reluctantly or not at all).
I never got told off for that strategy either. And, because it felt like my job, I never thought to tell anyone else.
Eventually, Andy saw me disassembling chunks of code, and writing paper maps that filled several desks. He asked me what I was doing, and I explained. He seemed interested, and amused, but that first conversation didn’t seem significant to me at the time.
Now, this was around the time that software available for the IBM PC, and only for the IBM PC, was killing established PC makers. Some were well down the line with creating clones, but many more had created systems that were different. Usually “better” — faster, better graphics, bigger memory capacity, whatever. But different enough that the new breed of software titles, that broke all the rules for “good practice” and depended on the specifics of the IBM PC, wouldn’t run.
Andy knew this from the inside. We had been involved in the PC project, and were one of the many software companies using clean room methods to produce a non-infringing “ROM BIOS” — the bit of code that sat between the chips and interfaces of the physical computer and the operating system (MS-DOS / PC-DOS, and other systems of the time such as CP/M-86, XENIX).
So he made up a story called Softclone, which was a combination of clever software, and painstaking software engineering work of the sort I’d been doing, to “fix” programs like Lotus 1-2-3, and which would buy time for PC makers while they got true PC clones out of the door.
I innovated a method, and made a few scores of companies less unhappy with their copy of some word processor or spreadsheet. But Andy, the entrepreneur, invented a small industry that created huge value, for a short time, for PC manufacturers facing extinction.
We need innovation. We need entrepreneurship. When innovation and entrepreneurship meet, the world changes.




