Planning Cities That Work
How much control should urban planners have?
With the ever-growing bounds of our largest and most populated cities, urban planning professionals and government agencies have unprecedented influence on the living environments of the populace. With this influence, planners are charged with the task of creating cities that purportedly “work” – a hazily defined and subjective measure of the success of an urban area. Planning is essential in creating a successful city in our current urban climate, the free-form “organic city” of the past no longer a relevant or legitimate urban practice in isolation. However, too much control can lead to monotony, and irresponsible planning can lead to urban inefficiency and, more dramatically, calamitous economic, social, and cultural disasters.
The characteristics that make a city “work” or “not work” are fluid and dependent on context – changing with reference to the needs and norms of its inhabitants, its political and geographical setting and its position within the society, and complex global network at large. Generally, cities that work will be economically sound, culturally vibrant, easily navigated, responsibly governed, and provide adequate and affordable housing and resources, a sanitary, healthy and safe environment, a secure job market and equitable opportunity for its residents (Branch 1985, Fowler 1992, Murie & Musterd 2010).
Ancient Rome, although constructed at a time well before modern concepts of urban design were conceived, is an example of a city that thrived under the significant control of planners, becoming the heart of one of history’s most potent empires. At its height, Ancient Rome is estimated to have had a population approaching one million people (Steele 2009), an unprecedented number at that point in history. A region of such size necessitated its planners to exert a high degree of control and influence over urban form and the development of infrastructure in order for the city to work. To accommodate this burgeoning population, planners implemented innovative and revolutionary practises, such as the construction of roads and aqueducts, providing the city with sanitation and an adequate water supply and facilitating the expansion of the Roman Empire through ease of transport and trade (Steele 2009). Rome was also carefully and effectively planned in a cultural sense. The Forum was constructed as the centre of Roman public life and used as a meeting place, a place of trade and a venue for public speeches, announcements and religious festivals (Grant 1970). Rome’s most famous building, the Colosseum, was constructed in an early example of urban renewal after the great fire of 64 C.E., transforming the area from a swampish region “occupied by modest houses and by some warehouses” to a giant amphitheatre that became the centre of Roman entertainment and city culture (Luciani 1990, p. 6). The control of Rome’s planners and their ideas behind these structures have been emulated in virtually every successful city since, firmly establishing it as a city that worked.
However, in some cases, the absence of stringent planning coupled with a sense of spontaneity can contribute to the invisible yet undeniably palpable “spirit” of a city. Melbourne and its laneways are an illustration of how less can be more in relation to urban planning and design. The original plan set out by Robert Hoddle for what was to become Melbourne’s CBD shows “no hint of lanes” in its gridded pattern (Bate 1994, p. 11). Instead, the lanes that now characterise Melbourne’s inner urban design “emerged gradually by accident, not planning, through the sale and subdivision of spacious blocks” (Bate 1994, p. 11). Through the last 150 years, these laneways have transformed from a set of unplanned alcoves to the irreplaceable hub and functioning symbol of the vitality of Melbourne’s artistic, musical, culinary and social cultures, showing how a lack of distinct planning can inadvertently create cities that work.
Vancouver, another city constantly featured amongst the world’s most liveable, is a modern example of how intelligent and well-managed planning can create a city that works. In the post-war era, Vancouver experienced a slight economic downturn that catalysed a shift from an industry-based economy to one emphasising services (Punter 2003). This downturn led to a rare population decrease in the decade from 1965 to 1975 and its government responded to this with aspirations of major urban redevelopment (Punter 2003). However, the urban planners charged with this task were receptive to the concerns held by Vancouver’s citizens about the changes that this redevelopment may bring about, particularly the impending transformation of the city’s core into a high density business district and the potential disruption of the city’s suburbs and culturally ingrained neighbourhoods. Consequently, original plans were altered to reflect these concerns and a system of “discretionary zoning” was established, allowing cost-effective and community-led urban expansion that met the needs of its residents whilst heightening the mixture of land-use and the sense of multiculturalism that is evident in the city today (Punter 2003). This and other planning initiatives have established Vancouver as a “compact, proto-sustainable city with a liveable downtown surrounded by a series of distinct high-density, mixed-use residential areas” that has “protected most of the best qualities of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century suburbs” (Punter 2003, p. 346). This displays that the control of planners – when coupled with openness to community involvement – can produce a city that works.
But if undertaken irresponsibly and with ignorance of the natural tendencies of an environment, planning can lead to a city unprepared for the reality of its environment, amplifying rather than alleviating the potential issues of an urban region in times of disaster. Although it could be seen as harsh to judge the success of planning in such trying conditions, if a city is known to be in a location of vulnerability and planners are given adequate control, these planners have the responsibility of minimising this risk to the lowest reasonable level.
New Orleans and its experience in the events of Hurricane Katrina marks it as a prime example of urban mismanagement in relation to a city’s environmental setting. Here, planners had a high degree of control in both the city’s urban network and the systems put in place to protect it in the probable event of a hurricane. The United States Army Corps of Engineers (hereafter USACE) are a significant force in infrastructure planning and construction in the US, and were responsible for the implementation of a flood-control system in New Orleans (USACE 2013, Herron & Smith 2012). Experts, such as Hassan Mashriqui from Louisiana State University, considered Katrina a tame storm, saying it “was not the Big One – not even close” (Grunwald and Warrick 2005). Despite this, the flood levees that were planned and put in place by USACE failed in the events of Katrina due to flawed design and ignorance of soil characteristics of the New Orleans region (Herron & Smith 2012). The huge concrete embankments cracked and ruptured under the force of the storm, allowing the flooding of urban residential areas and subsequently the destruction of property and loss of life. Raymond Seed, an engineer that led an investigation on the systems failures, concluded that “people didn’t die because the storm was bigger than the system could handle… People died because mistakes were made, and because safety was exchanged for efficiency and reduced cost” (Schwartz 2006, in Herron & Smith 2012, p. 130). So, despite planners having a firm grip on the control of New Orleans’ urban framework and methods of protection in the event of severe weather events, the irresponsibility of these planners and their flawed decision-making firmly planted it as a city that did not work within the reality of its environment.
Flawed planning can also result in the far less destructive yet equally economically damaging issue of urban inefficiency. With major shifts in transportation norms over the last century, urban planners and traffic engineers have had the task of creating cities that flow, installing an urban transport network that minimises congestion and maximises societal mobility. Based on statistics from INRIX, the average American spends 42 hours a year sitting in stagnant traffic (Strong 2013). This in turn has a substantially detrimental impact on not only the economy (as over $100 billion was lost in “opportunity cost” due to this wastage), but also for the environment, as billions of litres of fuel is consumed and tonnes of pollutants are emitted in this standstill (Strong 2013). This congestion, when isolated, is not enough to conclude that an urban environment does not “work,” but it does display quite clearly that – although a high degree of control has been exerted by planners on this issue – planning sometimes does not have the ability to ameliorate urban issues.
Too often, excessive and exclusive control of planners results in a city marked by monotony and a morose social and cultural environment. This argument, popularised by the work of Jane Jacobs (1961), posits that planners are unable to artificially manufacture and instil the vitality and intricate complexity that makes cities work (Fishman 1980). Jacobs saw stringent land-use planning and urban renewal as damaging to a city’s diversity, diminishing of personal liberty and, with reference to the functionalist ideas of Le Corbusier – whose dream would see a city dominated by giant residential skyscrapers interspersed with parkland (Jacobs 1961) – as a “terrible oversimplification of urban order” (Fishman 1980, p. 247). Jacobs ideas, synthesised with public resistance to large-scale alterations of existing urban form, created a firm understanding of the deficiencies of urban planning within a unique and complex social milieu.
Get Lachy Simpson’s stories in your inbox
Join Medium for free to get updates from this writer.
So with all urban environments, the process of planning is not black and white, not something that can be copied and pasted to and from cities of vastly differing contexts and urban frameworks. Due to their complex nature and eccentricities, an impromptu city is just as impossible as an entirely planned one. So, how much control should planners have in the creation and ongoing development of these urban environments? A higher degree of planning does not necessarily solve the issues of cities that do not work, and planning is far from the sole reason that cities do work. Planning, however, is essential in creating a basis for an efficient and effective urban network, but these plans – especially when existing forms and structures will be altered or replaced – must be culturally sensitive, aware of the city’s social and geographical environment and inviting and receptive of the input of its current residents.
References:
Bate, W 1994, Essential but Unplanned: The Story of Melbourne’s Lanes, State Library of Victoria, Melbourne
Branch, MC 1985, Comprehensive City Planning: Introduction & Explanation, Planners Press, American Planning Association, Chicago
Fishman, R 1980, ‘The anti-planners: the contemporary revolt against planning and its significance for planning history’ in G Cherry (ed), Shaping a Modern World, Mansell, London, p. 243–252
Fowler, EP 1992, Building Cities That Work, McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal
Grant, M 1970, The Roman Forum, Macmillan, New York
Grunwald, M & Warrick, J 2005, ‘Investigators Link Levee Failures to Design Flaws’, The Washington Post, October 24, viewed 23 May <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/23/AR2005102301200.html>
Herron, J & Smith, MW 2012, ‘The Disaster of Hurricane Katrina: Malfeasance, Offical Deviance and the Failure to Serve and Protect a Community’, The International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences, vol. 6, no. 5, p. 128–139
Jacobs, J 1961, The Death And Life Of Great American Cities, Random House, New York
Luciani, R 1990, The Colosseum: Architecture, History, And Entertainment In The Flavian Amphitheatre, Ancient Rome’s Most Famous Building, Novara : Istituto geografico De Agostini
Musterd, S, & Murie, A 2010, Making Competitive Cities, Wiley-Blackwell, Ames, Iowa
Punter, J 2003, The Vancouver Achievement: Urban Planning And Design, UBC Press, Vancouver
Steel, P 2009, The Roman Empire (Passport to the past), Rosen Publishing Group, New York
Strong, M 2013, ‘Los Angeles Tops Congestion Index’, The Detroit Bureau, May 7, viewed 26 May, <http://www.thedetroitbureau.com/2013/05/los-angeles-tops-congestion-index/>
USACE 2013, Mission Overview, U.S Army Corps of Engineers, Washington, DC, <http://www.usace.army.mil/Missions.aspx>









