Lawful Interception (LI) - Internal Network Interfaces - Part 1 X1
Lawful Interception (LI) - Internal Network Interfaces - Part 1 X1
1 (2023-03)
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION
2 ETSI TS 103 221-1 V1.14.1 (2023-03)
Reference
RTS/LI-00238-1
Keywords
interface, lawful interception
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3 ETSI TS 103 221-1 V1.14.1 (2023-03)
Contents
Intellectual Property Rights ................................................................................................................................6
Foreword.............................................................................................................................................................6
Modal verbs terminology....................................................................................................................................6
1 Scope ........................................................................................................................................................7
2 References ................................................................................................................................................7
2.1 Normative references ......................................................................................................................................... 7
2.2 Informative references ........................................................................................................................................ 8
3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations .......................................................................................9
3.1 Terms.................................................................................................................................................................. 9
3.2 Symbols .............................................................................................................................................................. 9
3.3 Abbreviations ..................................................................................................................................................... 9
4 Overview ................................................................................................................................................11
4.1 Reference model ............................................................................................................................................... 11
4.1.1 Overview .................................................................................................................................................... 11
4.1.2 ADMF deployment model .......................................................................................................................... 11
4.1.3 Triggering deployment model..................................................................................................................... 12
4.1.4 Mediation and delivery function deployment model .................................................................................. 12
4.2 Reference model for X1: requesting and responding ....................................................................................... 12
4.3 Overview of security ........................................................................................................................................ 13
4.4 Relationship to other standards ........................................................................................................................ 13
4.5 Release management ........................................................................................................................................ 13
5 Basic concepts ........................................................................................................................................14
5.1 The lifecycle of a Task ..................................................................................................................................... 14
5.1.1 Start and end of a Task ............................................................................................................................... 14
5.1.2 Identification of a Task ............................................................................................................................... 14
5.1.3 Destinations ................................................................................................................................................ 14
5.1.4 Generic Objects .......................................................................................................................................... 14
5.2 The lifecycle of an X1 request/response........................................................................................................... 15
5.2.1 Identification of X1 request/response ......................................................................................................... 15
5.2.2 Responding to the request ........................................................................................................................... 15
5.2.3 Behaviour if a response is not received ...................................................................................................... 15
5.3 Warnings and Faults ......................................................................................................................................... 15
6 Message Structure and Data Definitions ................................................................................................16
6.1 X1 Message details ........................................................................................................................................... 16
6.2 Message definitions: starting, modifying and stopping tasks ........................................................................... 17
6.2.1 ActivateTask ............................................................................................................................................... 17
6.2.1.1 Summary ............................................................................................................................................... 17
6.2.1.2 TaskDetails............................................................................................................................................ 17
6.2.2 ModifyTask................................................................................................................................................. 20
6.2.3 DeactivateTask ........................................................................................................................................... 20
6.2.4 DeactivateAllTasks ..................................................................................................................................... 21
6.3 Message definitions: creating, modifying and removing Destinations ............................................................. 21
6.3.1 CreateDestination ....................................................................................................................................... 21
6.3.1.1 Summary ............................................................................................................................................... 21
6.3.1.2 DestinationDetails ................................................................................................................................. 22
6.3.2 ModifyDestination ...................................................................................................................................... 22
6.3.3 RemoveDestination..................................................................................................................................... 23
6.3.4 RemoveAllDestinations .............................................................................................................................. 23
6.4 Message details: getting information from NE ................................................................................................. 24
6.4.1 Overview .................................................................................................................................................... 24
6.4.2 GetTaskDetails ........................................................................................................................................... 24
6.4.2.1 Summary ............................................................................................................................................... 24
6.4.2.2 TaskStatus ............................................................................................................................................. 24
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IPRs essential or potentially essential to normative deliverables may have been declared to ETSI. The declarations
pertaining to these essential IPRs, if any, are publicly available for ETSI members and non-members, and can be
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Foreword
This Technical Specification (TS) has been produced by ETSI Technical Committee Lawful Interception (LI).
The present document is part 1 of a multi-part deliverable covering the Internal Network Interfaces for Lawful
Interception (LI), as identified below:
Part 1: "X1";
Part 2: "X2/X3".
"must" and "must not" are NOT allowed in ETSI deliverables except when used in direct citation.
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1 Scope
The present document defines an electronic interface for the exchange of information relating to the establishment and
management of Lawful Interception. Typically, this interface would be used between a central LI administration
function and the network internal interception points.
Typical reference models for LI define an interface between Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) and Communication
Service Providers (CSPs), called the handover interface. They also define an internal network interface within the CSP
domain between administration and mediation functions for lawful interception and network internal functions, which
facilitates the interception of communication. This internal network interface typically consists of three sub-interfaces;
administration (called X1), transmission of intercept related information (X2) and transmission of content of
communication (X3). The present document specifies the administration interface X1.
2 References
Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at
https://docbox.etsi.org/Reference/.
NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee
their long term validity.
The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document.
[1] ETSI TS 133 107: "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; Digital cellular
telecommunications system (Phase 2+) (GSM); 3G security; Lawful interception architecture and
functions (3GPP TS 33.107)".
[2] IETF RFC 4122: "A Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) URN Namespace".
[3] W3C® Recommendation 28 October 2004: "XML Schema Part 2: Datatypes Second Edition".
[4] ETSI TS 103 280: "Lawful Interception (LI); Dictionary for common parameters".
[5] Recommendation ITU-T E.212: "The international identification plan for public networks and
subscriptions".
[6] ETSI TS 123 003: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+) (GSM); Universal
Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; 5G; Numbering, addressing and identification
(3GPP TS 23.003)".
[8] IETF RFC 3966: "The tel URI for Telephone Numbers".
[9] IETF RFC 3508: "H.323 Uniform Resource Locator (URL) Scheme Registration".
[11] IETF RFC 2865: "Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)".
[13] IETF RFC 7230: "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing".
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[14] IETF RFC 5246: "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2".
[15] Void.
[16] IETF RFC 7525: "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)".
[17] IETF RFC 6125: "Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of
Transport Layer Security (TLS)".
[18] IETF RFC 4519: "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP): Schema for User
Applications".
[19] ETSI TS 103 221-2: "Lawful Interception (LI); Internal Network Interfaces; Part 2: X2/X3".
[20] IETF RFC 8446: "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3".
[22] ETSI TS 133 127: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+) (GSM); Universal
Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; 5G; Lawful Interception (LI) architecture and
functions (3GPP TS 33.127)".
[23] IETF RFC 6530: "Overview and Framework for Internationalized Email".
[24] W3C® Recommendation 21 March 2017: "XPath and XQuery Functions and Operators 3.1".
[26] FIPS PUB 202: "SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions".
[27] IETF RFC 7042: "IANA Considerations and IETF Protocol and Documentation Usage for IEEE
802 Parameters".
NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee
their long term validity.
The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the
user with regard to a particular subject area.
[i.2] ETSI TR 103 308: "CYBER; Security baseline regarding LI and RD for NFV and related
platforms".
[i.3] ETSI GS NFV-SEC 009: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); NFV Security; Report on use
cases and technical approaches for multi-layer host administration".
[i.4] ETSI GS NFV-SEC 012: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV) Release 3; Security; System
architecture specification for execution of sensitive NFV components".
[i.6] GSMA RCC.07: "Rich Communication Suite - Advanced Communications Services and Client
Specification".
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3.1 Terms
For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply:
Destination IDentifier (DID): identifier to uniquely identify a Destination internally to the X1 interface
Destination Set IDentifier (DSID): identifier to uniquely identify a Destination Set internally to the X1 interface
protocol error: error at the X1 protocol level (rather than any fault with ADMF or NE)
NOTE: In the present document, the term "error" in general refers to a protocol error, whereas issues with
systems not behaving correctly are called "faults".
task: continuous instance of interception at a single NE carried out against a set of target identifiers, identified by an
X1 Identifier, starting from an activate command and ending with a deactivate command or terminating fault
terminating fault: fault signalled from NE to ADMF which terminates the specific Task
X1 Identifier (XID): identifier to uniquely identify a Task internally to the X1 interface as well as across related X2
and X3 interfaces
NOTE: The XID is also either associated to only one LIID or can be allowed to be associated to multiple LIIDs.
3.2 Symbols
Void.
3.3 Abbreviations
For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply:
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NF Network Function
NFV Network Functions Virtualisation
OID Object ID
OWASP Open Web Application Security Project
POI Point Of Interception
QoS Quality of Service
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial In User Service
RCS Rich Communication Suite
RDN Relative Distinguished Name
SGSN Serving GPRS Support Node
SIP Session Initiation Protocol
SIP-URI Session Initiation Protocol Uniform Resource Identifier
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SUCI SUbscription Concealed Identifier
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TEL-URI Telephony Uniform Resource Identifier
TISPAN Telecommunication and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking
TLS Transport Layer Security
TPM Trusted Platform Module
UDP User Datagram Protocol
UID Unique IDentifier
URI Uniform Resource Identifier
UTF UCS Transformation Formats
UUID Universally Unique Identifier
xCC X3 Content of Communications
XID X1 Identifier
xIRI X2 Intercept Related Information
XML eXtended Markup Language
XSD XML Schema Definition
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4 Overview
X1
While the present document uses the terms Network Element (NE), the term is intended to represent any given
Network Function (NF) which is intended to be given information regarding interception or mediation and delivery.
Similarly, the term "ADMF" is intended to represent any given network function that controls interception or mediation
and delivery in other functions.
NE
NE X1
X1 ADMF Law Enforcement
NE X1
X1 Tasking interface
e.g. HI-1
NE (out of scope)
Only one ADMF shall make changes by X1 to a given NE. This is called the ADMF which is "responsible" for that NE.
Onward delivery of information from the NE is called X2 (for xIRI) and X3 (for xCC). X2 and X3 are defined in ETSI
TS 103 221-2 [19].
Some deployments may involve multiple ADMFs for redundancy or other purposes; where multiple ADMFs are
required, the NE shall be implemented such that it presents itself as a separate NE to each ADMF.
ADMF and NE shall implement time synchronization where possible; in situations where it is not possible, the ADMF
shall maintain knowledge of the timing offset between the ADMF and NE.
NOTE: The present document may be used in direct delivery scenarios, in which the NE delivers directly to the
LEMF. Any consequences of using direct delivery are out of scope of the present document.
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X1
If this deployment model is used, then in the following clauses references to the ADMF should be interpreted as
applying to the Triggering Function, while references to the NE should be interpreted as references to the Triggered
Function.
X1
Mediation Function
ADMF
(plays role of “NE”)
If this deployment model is used, then in the following clauses references to the NE should be interpreted as applying to
the MDF.
Requests may be sent in either direction i.e. with the ADMF or NE initiating the request. The side initiating the request
is called the "Requester"; this term is used when it is not specified whether it is the ADMF or NE making the request.
The other side is called the "Responder".
Request
Requester Responder
(could be (could be
ADMF or NE) Response ADMF or NE)
It is likely that in most situations, the ADMF will initiate the message i.e. to distribute information or request status.
However, it is possible that the NE will initiate the request in order to deliver fault reports, etc.
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Request
CSP
Network Element
Administration
(NE)
Function (ADMF) Response
ADMF is Requester
Request
CSP
Network Element
Administration
(NE)
Response Function (ADMF)
NE is Requester
NE implementers are strongly discouraged from exposing additional interfaces for controlling the LI functionality of the
NE other than by X1 e.g. via a local administrative interface at the NE. If such additional interfaces exist, any such
action performed on the NE shall be captured on the NE audit/logging, and any consequences of such actions shall be
able to be seen and controlled by the ADMF that is responsible for the NE i.e. the ADMF shall be able to use the X1
interface to stop or undo any changes made over a local administrative interface. There may be broader consequences
that are not covered by the present document if an NE is tasked independently of the X1 interface (e.g. security
concerns).
Some models of LI (e.g. 3GPP TS 33.107 [1] and 3GPP TS 33.127 [22]) define interfaces for the purposes described in
clause 4.1, (e.g. X1_1, X1_2 and X1_3 defined by 3GPP TS 33.107 [1]; or LI_X1 defined by 3GPP TS 33.127 [22]).
The present document is designed to fulfil the requirements for those interfaces.
• The major version should be incremented when making a backwards incompatible change.
• The minor version should be incremented when adding backwards compatible functionality.
• The patch version should be incremented when fixing a backwards compatible bug.
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Once a major version has been incremented, the previous major version will be supported for 2 years after publication
of the new version. Change requests issued to a version that is no longer supported will need to be issued for the latest
supported major version.
5 Basic concepts
The present document does not define which situations are categorized as "terminating faults". Local recovery
procedures should be followed before a Task is ended with a "terminating fault". In general, irrecoverable failures with
an interception, or major security issues at an NE should be considered terminating faults, and certain outcomes with
keepalives are also terminating faults (where defined in clause 6.6.2).
In the first case, each intercept is separately provisioned for a target ID at a given POI. In either case, the ADMF shall
provide the XID to LIID(s) mapping to the MDF.
5.1.3 Destinations
Intercepted traffic is delivered by the NE to a Destination. Each Destination is uniquely identified by a Destination
Identifier (DID), and is handled independently from details of the Task. DIDs can optionally be grouped with individual
DID preference weightings as part of a Destination Set. Destination Sets specify an action, which defines how DIDs
within the Destination Set are used; Destination Sets are uniquely identified by their Generic Object ID, which is
referred to as the Destination Set Identifier (DSID) (see annex E).
Each Task is associated with one or more Destinations or Destination Sets. Prior to associating a Task with a given DID
or DSID, it is required that a Destination with the DID, or Destination Set with the DSID has already been created (as
described in clause 6.3 and annex E) but there is no requirement that a connection has been successfully established for
that DID or DSID.
Checks regarding availability and status of downstream delivery of information are outside the scope of the present
document.
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An error response shall be sent if the request is not compliant syntactically (it does not match the schema) or
semantically (it is not compliant or consistent with the existing state of the NE e.g. activating an existing XID).
• "OK - Acknowledged and Completed" response shall be sent if the request is fully understood, compliant and
the request has been successfully completed. If the request was a request for information then all the
information shall be delivered together as part of the "OK - Acknowledged and Completed" response. The NE
and ADMF shall be designed so that information requested (status and Task information) is in a data store
which is readily available without undue delay and within TIME1.
• If the action requested cannot be completed within TIME1, an "OK - Acknowledged" response shall be sent.
A status report shall be sent by the NE as soon as the action is completed or if it is unsuccessful (see
clause 6.5.2.2). This status report shall be sent as a new request/response pair, using the same XID or DID but
the status report shall have its own X1TransactionID. The "OK - Acknowledged" response shall only be used
for responding to requests which are Activating, Modifying or Deleting either Tasks or Destinations (those in
clauses 6.2 and 6.3) and they shall not be used to respond to other request types.
• Warnings are one-off problems i.e. sent by the NE and then not referred to again over X1. Warnings shall not
be used for issues which are affecting traffic (i.e. losing content or intercept-related information). For example,
warnings may include resources being nearly exhausted but not yet traffic-affecting. Warnings should include
that keys/certificates are about to expire.
• Alerts are one-off problems that might affect traffic (e.g. cleared database).
• Faults are problems which the NE will continue to be aware of and which the NE is trying to manage and/or
rectify. Any issue which loses traffic is categorized as a fault.
Warnings and alerts are reported using issue-reporting messages (clause 6.5) but then are not included in any future
Status-Getting messages (see clause 6.4). The NE shall log any warnings and alerts for audit reasons.
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The NE shall remember which of the XIDs are in fault and whether the NE itself is in a fault situation. An issue report
(see clause 6.5) is required at the start of the fault. The NE shall report faults when responding to the Status-Getting
message defined in clause 6.4. The NE shall also indicate that a fault has been cleared (see clauses 6.5.2 and 6.5.3)
unless otherwise configured.
Mandatory (M),
Field Description Format Optional (O) or
Conditional (C)
ADMF Identifier Identifies the ADMF uniquely to the NE. Token as per W3C® M
Required to match the details provided by Recommendation [3],
the ADMF's X.509 certificate (see clause 8) section 3.4.2. Definition
and assignment of
identifiers is a
deployment issue
NE Identifier Uniquely identifies the NE to the ADMF. Token as per W3C® M
Required to match the details provided by Recommendation [3],
the NE's X.509 certificate (see clause 8) section 3.4.2.
Definition and
assignment of identifiers
is a deployment issue
MessageTimestamp Timestamp indicating the time the message See ETSI TS 103 280 [4] M
was sent Qualified Microsecond
Date Time
Version Version of the present document used for See clause 4.5 M
encoding the message
X1TransactionID Used to correlate Request and Response. An ID as defined in C
Shall be omitted for "TopLevelError" clause 5.2
situations as defined below this table but
otherwise is mandatory
In addition to the information in table 1, the X1 Request shall indicate the type of request being made (see clauses 6.2 to
6.6), and contain the appropriate request parameters for that type of request.
If the X1 Request could not be parsed, then the response shall be constructed with an ADMF and NE Identifier
(extracting the identifier of the Requester from the X.509 certificate if necessary), MessageTimestamp and Version, and
a "TopLevelError" flag but no other information.
If the request could be parsed then the response shall indicate the type of response being returned (see clauses 6.2 to
6.6) and contain the appropriate response parameters for that type of response.
A "RequestContainer" is used to contain one or more requests. All requests in a container are delivered at the same
time, from the same Requester and to the same Responder. There is no implication about which order they are
processed; for this reason, the ADMF should avoid sending ActivateTask and ModifyTask messages for the same XID
in the same RequestContainer. A "ResponseContainer" is used to contain all the responses to the requests in the
container. The ordering of these responses does not have a meaning. All responses are sent at the same time, from the
same Responder and to the same Requester. The RequestContainer and ResponseContainer shall be used even if there is
one request and one response.
For each "OK - Acknowledged" response received for the requests transported by a "RequestContainer", the requester
should implement logic to assure the related status report is received and the transaction is completed or initiate a
recovery procedure.
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6.2.1.1 Summary
DIRECTION: ADMF to NE.
Table 2: ActivateTaskRequest
Table 3: ActivateTaskResponse
6.2.1.2 TaskDetails
The TaskDetails structure shall include the following.
Table 4: TaskDetails
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If a Task has an invalid combination of DeliveryType and Destinations (e.g. "X2andX3" delivery specified, but only an
X2 Destination given), then the NE shall reject the ActivateTaskRequest with an appropriate error.
If a Task has a ServiceType not supported by the NE, then the NE shall reject the ActivateTaskRequest with an
appropriate error. If the expected services to which interception applies are the only services that an NE provides, then
inclusion of ServiceType to the LI function in that NE is not necessary. If the ServiceType is not included, then
interception applies to all services supported by the NE.
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6.2.2 ModifyTask
DIRECTION: ADMF to NE.
USAGE: Used by the ADMF to modify an existing Task on the NE. All details for the Task shall be given
(i.e. the modified details and the information that is unchanged) to totally replace the previous
Task details.
Depending on the NE implementation, it may not be possible to modify some or all of the Task details. If the NE cannot
modify one or more of the elements in the ModifyTaskRequest, it shall reject the entire ModifyTaskRequest with an
appropriate error response.
The length of time an NE requires to make the changes requested in the ModifyTaskRequest message is an
implementation detail, but the expectation is that changes are made without undue delay.
Table 6: ModifyTaskRequest
Field Description Format M/C/O
Task details Target and interception details (same as for ActivateTaskRequest) See clause 6.2.1.2 M
Table 7: ModifyTaskResponse
Field Description Format M/C/O
OK or Error The general errors in clause 6.7 apply. Also, it is an error if the XID is See clause 6.7 M
not already present
6.2.3 DeactivateTask
DIRECTION: ADMF to NE.
USAGE: Used by the ADMF to deactivate (permanently stop and remove) a Task on the NE.
There is no concept of suspension or temporary deactivation. To stop a Task "temporarily", ADMFs shall deactivate the
Task and then activate a new Task.
Table 8: DeactivateTaskRequest
Field Description Format M/C/O
XID See clause 5.1 See clause 5.1 M
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Table 9: DeactivateTaskResponse
Field Description Format M/C/O
OK or Error The general errors in clause 6.7 apply. Also, it is an error if the XID is not See clause 6.7 M
already present at the NE
6.2.4 DeactivateAllTasks
DIRECTION: ADMF to NE.
USAGE: If enabled, the DeactiveAllTasks command shall perform a "DeactiveTask" command for all Tasks
on the NE.
The DeactiveAllTasks request shall be supported by all implementations of the present document. It should be agreed in
advance as to whether the DeactivateAllTasks request is enabled or disabled. By default (if there has been no agreement
in advance) then DeactivateAllTasks is enabled.
6.3.1.1 Summary
DIRECTION: ADMF to NE.
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6.3.1.2 DestinationDetails
DestinationDetails relate to the delivery of information from the NE to a Destination.
6.3.2 ModifyDestination
DIRECTION: ADMF to NE.
USAGE: Used by the ADMF to modify an existing Destination on the NE. All details for the Destination
shall be given (i.e. the modified details and the information that is unchanged) to totally replace
the previous Destination details.
Depending on the NE implementation, it may not be possible to modify some or all Destination details while the
Destination is in use. If the NE cannot modify one or more of the elements in the ModifyDestinationRequest, it shall
reject the entire ModifyDestinationRequest with an appropriate error response.
The length of time an NE requires to make the changes requested in the ModifyDestinationRequest message is an
implementation detail, but the expectation is that changes are made without undue delay.
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6.3.3 RemoveDestination
DIRECTION: ADMF to NE.
A Destination may only be removed if it is not referenced by any Tasks. An NE shall respond with an appropriate error
if the ADMF attempts to remove a Destination that is referenced by a Task.
6.3.4 RemoveAllDestinations
DIRECTION: ADMF to NE.
The RemoveAllDestinations request shall be supported by all implementations of the present document.
It shall be agreed in advance as to whether the RemoveAllDestinations request is enabled or disabled. By default (if
there has been no agreement in advance) then RemoveAllDestinations is enabled.
If RemoveAllDestinations is enabled, then a RemoveAllDestinations request shall remove all Destinations on that NE,
or it shall trigger an error for the general error conditions listed in clause 6.7. Since a RemoveDestination request can
only be issued against destinations that are not in use, an NE shall respond with an error if the ADMF sends a
RemoveAllDestinations request while any of the Destinations are referenced by Tasks.
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• GetAllDetails: requests details of all Tasks, Destinations, Generic Objects and the status of the NE itself.
• ListAllDetails: requests the XIDs of all Tasks, DIDs of all Destinations and Object IDs of all Generic Objects
(i.e. not all the details).
6.4.2 GetTaskDetails
6.4.2.1 Summary
DIRECTION: ADMF to NE.
6.4.2.2 TaskStatus
The TaskStatus contains information about a Task as collected internally by the NE.
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6.4.3 GetDestinationDetails
6.4.3.1 Summary
DIRECTION: ADMF to NE.
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6.4.3.2 DestinationStatus
The DestinationStatus relates only to the status of the delivery Destination as seen by the NE.
6.4.4 GetNEStatus
6.4.4.1 Summary
DIRECTION: ADMF to NE.
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6.4.5 GetAllDetails
6.4.5.1 Summary
DIRECTION: The GetAllDetails command goes from ADMF to NE.
USAGE: For the ADMF to determine the details of all Tasks, Destinations and the status of the NE itself.
6.4.6 ListAllDetails
6.4.6.1 Summary
DIRECTION: ADMF to NE.
USAGE: Used by the ADMF to retrieve the list of all XIDs and DIDs (i.e. a list of identifiers) but no details.
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6.4.7 GetAllTaskDetails
6.4.7.1 Summary
DIRECTION: The GetAllTaskDetails command goes from ADMF to NE.
6.4.8 GetAllDestinationDetails
6.4.8.1 Summary
DIRECTION: The GetAllDestinationDetails command goes from ADMF to NE.
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6.4.9 GetAllGenericObjectDetails
6.4.9.1 Summary
DIRECTION: The GetAllGenericObjectDetails command goes from ADMF to NE.
USAGE: For the ADMF to determine the details of all Generic Objects.
6.5.2.1 Summary
DIRECTION: NE to ADMF.
USAGE: The NE shall send a ReportTaskIssue request when it becomes aware of an issue (warning or fault)
relating specifically to a particular XID. It shall also be used to follow up on an
"OK - Acknowledged" response, to signal that a request has been completed (clause 5.2)
successfully or unsuccessfully.
Faults and warnings are defined in clause 5.3; see also clause 5.1 about terminating and non-terminating faults.
If a non-terminating fault is cleared, the NE shall send another ReportTaskIssue indicating the fault is cleared.
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It is possible that the ADMF is not aware of the XID which is referenced in the NE message. The ADMF shall not send
an error back to the NE in this situation: it is for the ADMF to decide how to handle this (e.g. GetAllDetails or
GetAllTaskDetails or Deactivate the XID in question are possible approaches).
• Terminating fault. The message is used by the NE to indicate that the Task has experiences a terminating fault
and has been deactivated.
• Implicit Deactivation: A Task with the "ImplicitDeactivationAllowed" flag has been deactivated.
• Actioned: Request has been fully actioned and was successful (to follow up on "OK - Acknowledged"
response from clause 5.2).
• Failed: Request has been fully actioned but was unsuccessful (to follow up on "OK - Acknowledged" response
from clause 5.2). This is a terminating fault.
6.5.3.1 Summary
DIRECTION: NE to ADMF.
USAGE: The NE shall send a ReportDestinationIssue request when it becomes aware of an issue (warning
or fault) relating specifically to a particular DID. It shall also be used to follow up on an
"OK - Acknowledged" response, to signal that a request has been completed (clause 5.2)
successfully or unsuccessfully.
Faults and warnings are defined in clause 5.3; see also clause 5.1 about terminating and non-terminating faults.
If a non-terminating fault is cleared, the NE shall send another ReportDestinationIssue indicating the fault is cleared.
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6.5.4 ReportNEIssue
DIRECTION: NE to ADMF.
USAGE: The NE shall send a ReportNEIssue request when it becomes aware of an issue (warning, alert or
fault) relating to the whole NE.
USAGE: At any time from the ADMF or NE, to get a response over the X1 interface (does not test X2 or
X3 or onward delivery).
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6.6.2 Keepalive
DIRECTION: The Keepalive command goes from ADMF to NE.
The Keepalive functionality shall be supported by NE and ADMF. It is for prior agreement to determine whether
Keepalives are enabled or disabled. By default (with no prior agreement) they are enabled. It is intended as a means for
the NE application to assert that the ADMF application is still operational, and remove all tasking information as a
security measure if it is not.
If Keepalives are enabled, the ADMF shall send out a Keepalive message at least every TIME_P1 (by default TIME_P1
is 1 minute) if no other X1 request has been sent to the NE.
If Keepalives are enabled, the NE shall respond with an OK for each Keepalive; if the NE has not seen a Keepalive
message for TIME_P2 (by default TIME_P2 is 1 hour) then the NE shall perform a DeactivateAllTasks command
i.e. deactivate all XIDs on the NE. The NE implementation shall reset the timer whenever any X1 Request is received
from the ADMF (including a Keepalive Request).
An ErrorResponse is a response which has the information from clause 6.1, but the response body has an error code
from the list below and a free text field for further information. It has the following structure.
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The ErrorResponse is used only as a response to a request which could not be actioned or understood. It is different
from reporting on the status of the Task which are called "faults" and "warnings" but not "protocol errors".
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6.8.1.1 Summary
DIRECTION: ADMF to NE.
USAGE: Used by the ADMF to add a new Generic Object to the NE.
Generic Objects provide a means of storing additional information at the NE beyond that described by Tasks or
Destinations. If the NE already contains a Generic Object with the same objectID as the one supplied in the
CreateObjectRequest, the NE shall reject the request with an appropriate error response. If the NE cannot store the
supplied record e.g. because it does not support the supplied object type, it shall reject the CreateObjectRequest with an
appropriate error response.
6.8.1.3 GenericObjectID
A GenericObjectID uniquely identifies a given Generic Object. Derived Generic Object types may introduce further
identifier fields, but the GenericObjectID shall be unique for that object at the NE, and shall be the identifier used in
relevant Generic Object messages (see clause 6.8).
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6.8.2 ModifyObject
6.8.2.1 Summary
DIRECTION: ADMF to NE.
USAGE: Used by the ADMF to modify an existing Generic Object on the NE. All the details for the object
shall be given (i.e. the modified details and the information that is unchanged) to totally replace
the previous object details.
Depending on the NE implementation, it may not be possible to modify some or all of the object details. If the NE
cannot modify one or more of the elements in the modifyObject structure, it shall reject the entire ModifyObjectRequest
with an appropriate error response.
6.8.3 DeleteObject
6.8.3.1 Summary
DIRECTION: ADMF to NE.
USAGE: Used by the ADMF to remove a Generic Object from the NE.
6.8.4 GetObject
6.8.4.1 Summary
DIRECTION: ADMF to NE.
USAGE: Used by the ADMF to retrieve details of a particular Generic Object from the NE.
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6.8.5 ListObjectsOfType
6.8.5.1 Summary
DIRECTION: ADMF to NE.
USAGE: Used by the ADMF to retrieve all identifiers (objectIDs) of objects stored at the NE that have a
particular type.
6.8.6 DeleteAllObjects
6.8.6.1 Summary
DIRECTION: ADMF to NE.
USAGE: If enabled, the DeleteAllObjects command shall perform a "DeleteObject" command for all
Generic Objects on the NE.
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The DeleteAllObjects request shall be supported if the implementation supports Generic Objects. It should be agreed in
advance as to whether the DeleteAllObjects request is enabled or disabled. By default (if there has been no agreement in
advance) then DeleteAllObjects is enabled.
7.1 Introduction
The present document defines a single profile for transport and encoding of X1 messages.
7.2 Profile A
7.2.1 Encoding
XML encoding shall be used. An XSD schema is provided in archive ts_10322101v011401p0.zip which accompanies
the present document. In the event of a discrepancy between the XSD schema and the present document, the present
document shall be considered authoritative.
The attached samples provide an informative example for implementations of the present document. The samples do not
form part of the normative specification.
The attached tool "validate_examples.py" allows implementers to validate the XSD against the attached examples.
In this clause, the term HTTP is used (it is implicit that it is in fact HTTPS i.e. that the HTTP is used over TLS).
• For messages where the ADMF is the requester, the ADMF shall use its HTTP client and the NE shall use its
HTTP server.
• For messages where the NE is the requester, the NE shall use its HTTP client and the ADMF shall use its
HTTP server.
• Each "RequestContainer" shall be sent as a HTTP request. It shall be a "POST" message (regardless of which
type of X1 request it is) and the message body shall contain the RequestContainer as described in clause 6.
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• The response shall indicate HTTP level errors within the range of HTTP error codes. If the HTTP level
transaction is successful, then the response shall be a 200 OK message, with the ResponseContainer contained
within the message body.
• HTTP error codes shall only be used to indicate HTTP-level errors, and shall not be used to indicate errors
with the X1 responses themselves. X1-level errors shall be indicated by correct use of the appropriate X1
ErrorResponse, encoded and returned as a HTTP 200 OK response.
7.2.2.3 Profile
The following profile shall be used:
HTTP version 1.1 or HTTP/2 shall be used. ADMF implementations shall support both.
Where used, HTTP version 1.1 shall be used as per IETF RFC 7230 [13] and related specifications.
NOTE: HTTP/1.1 defaults to the use of "persistent connections" (see IETF RFC 7230 [13], section 6.3).
Implementers are encouraged to support the use of persistent connections.
Where used, HTTP/2 shall be used as per IETF RFC 7540 [21] and related specifications.
A Requester may issue multiple HTTP requests in parallel over multiple HTTP connections or multiplexed HTTP/2
requests. However, such implementations should be aware that there is no guarantee of the order in which these
requests are processed by the Responder. If such ordering is important to the Requester, it is responsible for ensuring
the requests are sent out in the correct order, and for waiting for the response to each request before issuing the next
one. Transfer Coding shall not be applied to the HTTP Request or Response (see IETF RFC 7230 [13], section 4).
By default, port 443 shall be used. If this is already in use, then the NE and ADMF shall be able to be configured with a
port number, which shall be agreed prior to use of the standard.
By default, the ADMF shall send the HTTP requests with the path set to "/X1/NE" and the NE shall send the HTTP
requests with the path set to "/X1/ADMF". An exception to the default shall only be made with strict agreement
between NE and ADMF; however, implementers shall ensure that an X1 implementation can be configured with a
different path if required.
8 Security
8.1 Overview
This clause details security measures to be implemented for the X1 interface. Other security aspects related to the NE
(e.g. secure storage of information, access control) are out of scope of the present document.
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8.2.2 Profile
TLS shall be followed, using at least version 1.2 as defined in IETF RFC 5246 [14], supporting the recommendations
given in IETF RFC 7525 [16].
New implementations should support TLS 1.3 as defined in IETF RFC 8446 [20].
NOTE: It is assumed that the NE and ADMF are in a physically secure environment. For future uses (e.g. NFV),
then this assumption would no longer be valid. Further details would then need to be added about the
security of storage of key or certificate material e.g. TPM, Secure enclaves. See ETSI TR 103 308 [i.2],
ETSI GS NFV-SEC 009 [i.3] and ETSI GS NFV-SEC 012 [i.4].
8.2.4 Authentication
Implementations shall perform mutual authentication using X.509 certificates following IETF RFC 6125 [17].
Implementations shall ensure that it is configurable which certificates are used.
X1 implementations shall check that the UID relative distinguished name (OID 0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1) of the
Subject field in the certificate (see IETF RFC 4519 [18], section 2.39) provided matches the Sender or Receiver ID
(whichever is provided by the other party in the communication). If a Responder receives an X1 message where these
values do not match, it shall respond with an X1 error message indicating that the Requester is not authorized. If the
Requester receives a response where these values do not match, then it shall disregard the response and log an
appropriate error message.
The present document does not recommend that message-layer encryption or message-level message authentication
codes are used in addition to the provisions in this clause. Of course, there may be threat models in which additional
encryption may be thought to be useful. The present document does not forbid adding message-layer encryption e.g. by
encrypting the whole of the payloads of the request and response messages. The details of the changes needed to do this
are outside the scope of the present document.
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Annex A (normative):
Requirements
R1) Future proof: Changes can be made and new features can be added. A version structure will allow for
co-existence of different versions.
R2) Open structure: The interface will have an open structure that will allow for extensions. Though it should be
as strict as possible to make implementations as interoperable as possible. Extensions should not have any
negative impact on security and other requirements.
R3) Security: Authentication, integrity protection and confidentiality shall be supported from end to end.
R4) Authenticity: The authenticity of a message can be checked in a standalone environment (e.g. no connection
to an online server needed, root certificate can be enough).
R5) Legal framework: The present document contains a technical specification which is independent of national
legislation. It does not supersede national legislation or approved practices.
R6) Direct delivery: Some network elements support direct delivery of IRI and CC without any additional
mediation and delivery function. The interface should also support administration of these network elements.
R7) Core functionality: It shall be possible to provision (create, modify and delete) interceptions including all
necessary parameters (e.g. CC/IRI-destination) on network nodes. It shall be possible to retrieve details of a
single or all interceptions provisioned on a network node.
R8) Administration: It shall be possible to administrate LI relevant configuration on network nodes (e.g. update
of security certificates).
R9) Node Scope: The X1 architecture and protocol shall support administration of all nodes involved in capture
and control of target intercept traffic including intercept nodes and mediation and delivery functions. This
shall include both on-switch and off switch probe scenarios.
R10) Basic functionality: The basic message exchange protocol shall be able to carry both generic LI parameters
(e.g. those obtained from X1 E-warrant interface) and Interception Node manufacturer specific parameters.
R11) Extensible: The basic message exchange protocol shall allow limited extensibility to support parameter not
currently supported by the base protocol. This extensibility shall be limited to encourage future extension of
the standardized basic functionality in future versions of the X1 standard.
R12) Flexibility: The X1 architecture and message exchange technique shall be flexible to allow implementation
in both existing and future national and international operator network architectures. As a minimum it shall
be compatible with 3GPP, TISPAN/NTECH, NFV SEC, ETSI TC LI, ANSI and other international network
architecture and handover standards.
R13) One-to-many: The architecture and message protocol shall support both one-to-one and one-to-many LI end
point configurations (i.e. it shall be possible to provision hundreds of end points simultaneously and
efficiently).
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R14) Backwards compatibility: The X1 architecture and protocol shall be backwards compatible with existing LI
devices where possible. Specifically the standardized X1 shall not place significantly more performance or
load impacts than existing proprietary approaches on LI nodes.
There is no specific requirement to retro-fit this X1 standards onto existing IP or legacy circuit switched
nodes, although the standards does not prohibit such retrofitting where practical. Parallel running of X1 and
legacy or proprietary interfaces shall be supported where practical. The X1 architecture shall permit different
versions of X1 to be running on different components and (as far as is practical) the functionality from the
older version shall still continue to work (though features introduced in the new versions shall cause errors to
be sent).
R15) Lightweight: Many LI devices (e.g. Switches/Routers) currently use lightweight protocols such as SNMP,
and have limited processing power and/or limited application layer intelligence. The protocol shall be
designed to support such lightweight devices.
R16) Permanent and dynamic connections: The X1 architecture and message exchange technique shall support
both permanent connection and dynamic link/connection scenarios.
R17) Direct delivery: Support situation where interception is delivered direct to LEMF without further CSP
mediation. No need to explicitly draw this out but do allow enough information over X1 to support this
situation.
R18) Delay: The X1 architecture and message exchange technique shall by design not introduce undue delay
compared with existing proprietary X1 implementations.
R19) Dynamic Triggering and HI1: The X1 architecture and message exchange technique shall be compatible
and interoperable with both ETSI TC LI HI1 and Dynamic Triggering standards.
NOTE: Requirement is limited to authenticating the LI function identity and not authenticating the software
version or integrity.
R21) Authorization: The X1 architecture and message exchange technique shall provide both authorization of
physical end points and authorization of the software application receiving the message.
R22) Accounting and audit: The X1 architecture and message exchange technique shall include sufficient
information to enable Accounting & Auditing functions in the ADMF and NE.
R23) Integrity protection: The X1 message exchange technique shall provide integrity protection for all messages
exchanged between nodes in the X1 architecture. Use of Integrity protection shall be mandatory.
R24) Confidentiality protection: The X1 message exchange technique shall provide confidentiality protection for
all messages exchanged between nodes in the X1 architecture.
R25) Replay protection: The X1 message exchange technique shall provide replay protection for all messages
exchanged between nodes in the X1 architecture.
R26) Standalone interface: The X1 architecture and message exchange technique shall be designed as a
standalone physically dedicated LI interface. The design and selection of the protocol shall where possible
ensure vulnerabilities in non-LI interfaces on the same node shall not impact LI interfaces and security.
R27) Hardened Protocol: The X1 message exchange technique shall use a harden protocol containing minimal
options or extensions which are not specifically required by X1.
R28) Minimum Security Level: The X1 architecture and message exchange techniques shall provide a minimum
level of security (including cypher suites and key length), which shall be supported by all nodes. At least
two algorithms shall be specified. The protocol and algorithms shall be resistant to bid down attack.
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R29) Underlying Infrastructure Trust: The X1 architecture and message exchange techniques shall assume by
default that the underlying network communication links and infrastructure are untrusted.
R30) Firewall and NAT Transversal: The X1 message exchange technique shall be compatible with existing
operator firewall and NAT transversal architectures. The message exchange technique shall not require
unrestricted opening of common ports (e.g. port 80 or 21). The message exchange technique shall not
prohibit the development of future X1 aware firewall filtering to provide rejection of malicious X1 message
at operator security gateways.
R31) Certificate and Key Management: The X1 architecture and message exchange techniques shall include
(where applicable) Certificate and Key Management mechanisms. In addition mechanisms for
Certificate/Key revocation shall be provided.
R32) Single Node Compromise: The X1 architecture and message exchange techniques shall ensure that a
vulnerability or weak implementation in one node does not adversely affect other nodes. Specifically it shall
not be possible to attack one interception node by using recovered plan text or other security parameters from
a vulnerable one.
R33) Node Administration: The X1 architecture and message exchange techniques shall ensure by design that
within node implementations, non-LI super-users can be prevented from making LI related parameters
changes without authority from and knowledge of the LI administrator.
R34) Encryption of target information: It shall be possible to use encrypted target information only by use of
encrypted targets and encryption keys. In case of encrypted information it shall be possible to change
encrypted target information and encryption keys periodically without interruption of any active interception.
• Activity: Amount of intercepted traffic? Maximum and average bandwidth? Minutes of intercepted voice?
Count of intercepted messages? Time of last activity?
• Maximum number of parallel intercepted accounts/connections with same target identifier (e.g. in case of
IMEI duplicates).
The performance requirements are derived from measures of the amount and rate of Lawful Interception. Clearly this
will vary but some guidelines are as follows:
• Considerations of the bandwidth of intercepted traffic are in general not relevant to X1 (except perhaps for a
NE to report that bandwidth is exceeding certain parameters).
- This number is usually very small compared to the total number of users and for the purposes of the
present document will be considered as tens or hundreds at most.
• Are there situations where a single target on cover causes a lot of X1 messages. Consider the following ways
this could happen:
- Can a single target cause a large number of target identifiers to be tasked (consider roaming)?
- Can one have a large number of HI1 messages for each target identifier (frequent changing of
parameters)?
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- For a single ADMF-NE link, can one have lots of X1 messages for a given HI1 message arriving at the
ADMF?
- How many different NEs can each ADMF have to talk to?
R36) Ability to send frequent list messages, with a status update response.
R37) Ability to send occasional urgent messages from NE as error messages, with a "received OK" response.
R39) Able to be secured using standard techniques. Discuss whether there are concerns about what has to be
opened in various firewalls to let it through.
R40) Simple and lightweight, suitable for use on standard network equipment in broadband (e.g. router) and
mobile communications (e.g. SGSN).
R41) Helpful (non-essential) if it is able to group multiple messages together so that one security check is not
needed for each message (this can be handled by a grouping function within our message layer though nicer
not to).
R42) No unnecessary buffering or delays of some messages compared to others, though perhaps does not need to
guarantee the order of delivery of messages.
R43) No QoS - the interface will not prioritize or buffer any information. Needs to deliver messages to end point,
which can either accept the message (and buffer/prioritize if it chooses) or reject.
- Helpful if it can relay an immediate "don't understand" response as a reply to a message i.e. without
understanding its contents.
No messages to be stalled/buffered or rejected by the transport layer because the receiving application layer is busy
creating a response.
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Annex B (normative):
Use of extensions
B.1 Overview
The present document defines a number of extension points, including in the TaskDetails structure (see clause 6.2.1.2),
and TargetIdentifier format (see table 5). This clause defines how extensions are to be used in table 4 and table 5.
An extension shall be a structure (e.g. a complexType in XSD) defined in a separate schema, and shall contain at a
minimum the following elements.
The extensions shall be defined in a namespace belonging to the entity responsible for drafting and maintaining the
extension. It shall not be defined in the namespace of the present document.
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Annex C (normative):
Using Task Object at Mediation and Delivery Functions
C.1 Overview
An ADMF may use X1 messages to provision a mediation and delivery function instead of a point of interception,
following the deployment model given in clause 4.1.4. This annex describes how the usage and meaning of the
messages defined in clause 6 differ when used for this purpose. Unless otherwise specified, the messages are used as for
any other NE.
C.2 TaskDetails
C.2.1 General
The TaskDetails structure used in the ActivateTask and ModifyTask messages are used as for an NE with the
differences described in the following clauses.
When a ModifyTask message is received by the MDF from the ADMF, the MDF shall, upon successful processing and
execution of the ModifyTask message, ensure that:
1) only the LIIDs included in the ModifyTask message (via a MediationDetails structure) remain active; and
2) any LIIDs that were associated with the task identified in the ModifyTask message, but were not identified in
the ModifyTask message, shall be deactivated (i.e. those intercepts shall cease).
To clarify the above, suppose that TaskID A had LIID 4 and LIID 5 associated with it and interception was active on
both LIID 4 and LIID 5. If a ModifyTask message is received and successfully processed by the MDF with a single
MediationDetails structure that includes LIID 4, then the interception on LIID 4 will remain active while the
interception on LIID 5 will cease.
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NOTE: RCS is defined as Rich Communication Services (see GSMA RCC.07 [i.6]).
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Annex D (normative):
Hashed Identifiers
D.1 Overview
Hashed identifiers provide an alternative to providing plain-text target identifiers over X1. This is intended to provide a
measure of additional security against disclosure of such target identifiers. However, it should be noted that this
technique does not provide protection against:
• An attacker in possession of hash information from verifying whether a specific given identifier matches a
given hash or salt.
• An attacker in possession of complete hash information (including salt) from recovering identifiers that have a
small set of possible values (e.g. MSISDN numbers in a particular country) by brute force attack.
Instead, this technique is intended to provide a simple extra layer of protection against e.g. accidental disclosure via a
user interface.
D.2.1 Overview
An ADMF wishing to provision an NE with a hashed identifier uses the following procedure:
1) The ADMF populates a Hash Context object with the operator's chosen hash algorithm identifier and ra
random salt value (see clause D.2.2).
2) The ADMF issues a CreateObject request containing the Hash Context object to the NE (see clause 6.8.1).
3) The ADMF calculates the hash digest of the required plain-text identifier using the details from the Hash
Context (see clause D.2.3.2).
4) The ADMF populates a HashedIdentifier structure with the digest, along with an indication of the target
identifier type and the identifier of the Hash Context object containing the salt (see clause D.2.3).
5) The ADMF issues an ActivateTask request containing the HashedIdentifier to the NE (see clause 6.2.1).
The NE can now inspect each candidate identity and create a hash digest using the information in the Hash Context. If
the digest matches the one in the HashedIdentifier structure, the NE can consider the target identity to have matched.
Hashed Identifiers may only be used for target identifier types which derive from simple types such as xs:token, and
which specify a single unambiguous value as a target identifier. Hashed Identifiers may not be used for:
• target identifier types which are complex types due to potential ambiguities in forming a canonical binary
representation (see clause D.2.3);
• target identifier types which do not describe a single unambiguous value (such as tcpPortRange) since it is
impossible to determine whether a given identifier matches the target identifier by comparing hashes.
However, a given Task may contain both hashed and non-hashed target identifiers (e.g. a hashed IPv4 address along
with a plain-text tcpPortRange) in its targetIdentifiers list.
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The choice of hash algorithm is made by the operator and enforced by the ADMF. ADMFs and NEs supporting hashed
identifiers shall support the use of the following hash algorithms:
• sha-256 with 256-bit value length as defined in IETF RFC 6920 [25].
• sha-512 with 512-bit value length as defined in IETF RFC 6920 [25].
• sha3-512 with 512-bit value length as defined in FIPS PUB 202 [26].
If the ADMF requests the creation of a Hash Context object with an unsupported hash algorithm or an insufficiently
long salt, the NE shall reject the request with an appropriate error.
A Hash Context and its associated salt may be used by multiple HashedIdentifier instances (see clause D.2.3) to reduce
the processing burden at the NE, at the cost of reducing the number of salts that an attacker would need to deal with if
attempting to exhaustively search for the original target identifier.
D.2.3 HashedIdentifier
D.2.3.1 Structure
A HashedIdentifier consists of the following elements.
1) Ensure that any plain-text target identity used to calculate a hashDigest is first correctly normalized into the
format defined by the relevant TargetIdentifier format (see table 5).
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2) For values where value comparisons are case-insensitive, transform the plain-text identity to lower-case. In
cases where parts of the value are case-insensitive and others are not (e.g. SIP URI) then only the case-
insensitive parts shall be lower-cased.
- For simple types derived from xs:token or xs:string, the binary representation shall be the octets giving
the UTF-8 encoding of the plain-text string.
- For simple types derived from xs:hexbinary, the binary representation shall be the octets represented by
the hexbinary notation.
- For simple types derived from xs:integer and which represent unsigned numbers, the binary
representation shall be the octets of the binary representation of that number given in network byte order
(i.e. big endian).
4) Concatenate the octets of the salt value from the associated Hash Context to the end of the binary
representation of the identity.
5) Take the hash of the concatenated result using the hash algorithm identified by the associated Hash Context.
The ADMF may now issue a CreateObjectRequest message to the NE with this Hash Object (see clause 6.8.1).
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Annex E (normative):
Destination Sets
E.1 Overview
When intercepted traffic is to be delivered by the NE to a Destination which belongs to a group of related Destinations
DIDs can be grouped together under a single DSID (see clause 5.1.3).
When Destination Sets are used each Task is associated with one or more Destination Sets. Prior to associating a Task
with a given DSID, it is required that a Destination Set with the DSID has already been created as described in
clause E.2 but there is no requirement that a connection has been successfully established for that DSID.
Checks regarding availability and status of downstream delivery of information are outside the scope of the present
document.
E.2.1 Overview
All Generic Object Methods are applicable to DestinationSetDetails Objects.
An ADMF wishing to use a DSID within a provisioning request towards an NE uses the following procedure:
• The ADMF populates a DestinationSetDetails object with the identifiers and values as described in
clause E.2.2.
• The ADMF issues a CreateObject request, containing the DestinationSetDetails object, to the NE (see
clause 6.8.1).
• The ADMF issues an ActivateTask request containing the DestinationSetDetails Generic Object ID(s), also
referred to as the DSID(s), to be used within the ListofDIDs field (see clause 6.2.1).
It is required that a Destination with the DID has already been created (as described in clause 6.3) before it can be
included within a Destination Set Details object, although there is no requirement that a connection has been
successfully established for that DID.
Depending on the NE implementation, it may not be possible to modify some elements or all of a Destination Set details
while the Destination Set is in use. If the NE cannot modify one or more of the elements in the ModifyObject request, it
shall reject the entire ModifyObject request with an appropriate error response.
The length of time an NE requires to make the changes requested in the ModifyObject request message is an
implementation detail, but the expectation is that changes are made without undue delay.
A Destination Set may only be removed if it is not referenced by any Tasks. An NE shall respond with an appropriate
error if the ADMF attempts to remove a Destination Set that is referenced by a Task.
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Where the DestinationSetType included within the DestinationSetDetails is "Redundant" the POI will use the specified
DIDs as a set of redundant end points, it is mandatory for the "Preference" to be defined for each DID within a
Destination Set where the DestinationSetType is "Redundant". Preference defines the DIDs order of use with the
smallest integer indicating the most preferred DID(s). Should the most preferred DID(s) become unavailable the next
preferred and available DID(s) shall be used.
It is an implementation decision for the NE to determine whether to duplicate traffic if two or more DIDs with the same
Preference value are referenced within the same DestinationSetDetails object.
Where the DestinationSetType included within the DestinationSetDetails is "Duplicate", the NE will send copies of
intercepted traffic to all DIDs within the set, preference shall not to be included where the DestintionSetDetails is of
type "Duplicate".
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Annex F (informative):
Change history
Status of the present document: ETSI TS 103 221-1
Internal Network Interfaces; Part 1: X1
TC LI Approval
Version Remarks
Date
First publication
October 2017 1.1.1
XSD schema is provided in TS_103_221_01_v010101.xsd contained in archive
ts_10322101v010101p0.zip.
Included Change Request:
TS103221-1CR001r1 (cat F) Warning and Faults Reporting
February 2018 1.2.1 This CR was approved by TC LI#47 (5-7 February 2018, New Delhi)
July 2020 1.7.1 This CR was approved by TC LI#54-e (17-25 June 2020)
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March 2023 1.14.1 This CR was approved by TC LI#62 (31 January – 2 February 2023, Sophia Antipolis)
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History
Document history
V1.1.1 October 2017 Publication
V1.2.1 March 2018 Publication
ETSI